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OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A QUASI-REDUNDANT
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS

J.M. Kontoleon*

ABSTRACT
In many instances protective systems used in
nuclear reactors are quasi-redundant systems; each of
a number of safety channels feeds a number of
independent protective units. A reactor shutdown is
initiated if more than a specified number of units are
in favour of shut down. The objective is to achieve a
very high reliability at a reasonable cost.
An
analysis is presented to obtain the reliability, failsafe and fail-danger probabilities of a quasiredundant system. Three algorithms are given for:
(a) the design of a quasi-redundant system having the
maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint,
(b) the optimal design satisfying a given reliability
level at the minimum cost and
(c) the optimal design satisfying a combined safety
requirement at the minimum cost. The algorithms are
illustrated by way of examples.

PRO{E

1. Introduction
The major objectives of every design of a reactor
protective system is to achieve a low probability of
failure to initiate the protective action and a low
probability of the occurrence of any spurious
protecton action. In most instances, the methods used
to achLieve the first objective, cause a deviation from
the second one and vice versa1. As a consequence, the
design must be "optimal", in the sense that it should
involve a compromise between the desired objectives,
and satisfy the imposed techno-economical constraints.
To achieve the desired objectives, redundancy is
commonly used. The usual type of redundancy is to
connect n units so that to obtain a m-out-of-n:G
system; the protection action is initiated when a
coincidence of m or more unit trips occurs. If m=1,
then the probability of a reactor spurious trip is
maximum; if m=n, then the probability that the
protective system will initiate the protection action
is minimum. Thus, the proper selection of m, n will
give a compromise between the desired design
objectives of the m-out-of-n:G system. In the case of
a dynamic redundant system2, this compromise can be
achieved by adjusting the frequency of scanning of the
redundant units.

This paper presents an analysis of a quasiredundant reactor protective system and develops three
algorithms which result in the optimal design of such
systems. The quasi-redundant system3, is neither without redundancy nor with parallel redundancy and is
shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that each of the
safety channels (a channel involves the sensor and the
safety line) is connected to a number of protective
units (e.g., reactor temperature rate trip-amplifier
units); if there are J channels and M units per
channel, then the protective action is initiated when
K-out-of-J-M units vote in favour of the protective

J-M-K Quasi-Redundant

System

action.

Reference 3 analyses the reliability of such a
system when each channel and unit are either good or
bad. In this work, three states are considered for each
channel and unit (good, fail-safe and fail-danger) and
the objectives

are:

(a) to obtain the optimum J, M, K which result in the
maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint;

(b) to obtain the opt!rn'lm J, M, K in order
specified level of reliability at minimum

a

to achieve
cost;

and

(c) to obtain the optimum J, M, K resulting to a
reliability level above a specified one and to a faildanger probability below a specified level, at the

minimum cost.
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Figure 1.
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Following the notation given in the next section,
the reliability, fail-to-safe and fail-to-danger
probabilities of a quasi-redundant system are obtained.
These are further used in the formulation of three
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computer algorithms to solve the above described

(i)

All safety channels are good or FS, and (N-K+1)out-of-N units are FD: or

(ii)

j safety channels are FD, and at least m-outof-jM units are good or FD, and at least
(N-K+l-m)-out-of-(J-j)M units are FD. Then,

problems.

2.

Notation and Assumptions

number of safety channels
number of protective units per channel
minimum number of votes to initiate the
protective action
total number of units; N a J.M
unit fail-to-safe probability of failure
unit fail-to-danger probability of failure
channel fail-to-safe probability of
failure
channel fail-to-danger probability of
failure
reliability of the protective system
fail-to-safe probability of the protective
system
fail-to-danger probability of the
protective system
capital cost involved in a channel
unit capital cost
protective system cost; C(J,M) S J.cc
+ N.cu
cost constraint
denotes fail-safe and fail-danger channel
or unit failure, as stated in the text
integer part of x

3
N
K

N
qus

qud
qcs

qcd
R(J,M,K)

Qs (J,M,K)
Qd(J,M,K)
cc
cu

C(J,M)
C

FS, FD
[x] *

The following assumptions

are

made throughout the

paper:

1.

Safety channel and unit states are s-independent

2.

Safety channels and units can be in one of the
following three states: good, fail-to-safe and
fail-to-danger.

3.

A failed channel or unit cannot become good or
change mode of failure.

cause a

(ii)

.2

+

(

(j

qcs

qrs

X
i

(I-qus)(

[(

i)M)r

q

r

Ud('-q,,d) (J-j)M-r

(2)

r

.

i

Reliability

It is,
R

=

1

-

QS(J,M,K)
4.

Qd(J,M,K)

Optimal Design Subject to
Constraint

(3)
a

Cost

Consider the problem of maximising the reliability
of a quasi-redundant system, subject to a given cost
constraint, C. It is required to find the optimum
values of J, M and K (Jopt, Mopt and Kopt), such that

R(Jopt, Mopt, Kopt)

=

maxR(J,M,K), for C(Jopt, Mopt)

C

then, M takes its maximum value, Mmax

J=1;
=

(5)

[(C-cc) /cu]

then, J takes its maximum value, Jmax

M=1;

Jmax

=

[C/(cc + cu)]

(6)

Algorithm A
Steps:

1.

(1-qud)m qud

2a.
b.
3.

(1)
4.

Fail-danger probability

(a)

[M-m
qus

Considering the above two extreme cases, it is
reasonable to start with the one which gives the
higher reliability and then modify the design until the
maximum reliability is obtained. The algorithm is as
follows:

(m) qus (1-qus)

(1-qcs)

J-r)

(c)

0.

E

(J-i )

(r=N-K+I-m

spurious

The above give,

(1-qcs)

(J-j)M

(ii)

FS; m=O,l, ...,)jM, j=~1,2,...,$J.

=

(1-q5s)m

qcd(l-qcd)

ij

Mmax

j safety channels are FS, and at least
m-out-of-jM units are good or FS, and
at least (K-m)-out-of-(J-j)M units are

Qs (J,M,K)

ud (l-qud)

Is

(i)

All safey channels are good or FD, and at
least K-out-of-N units are FS; or

(i)

(

J=j

N-m

m

There are two extreme cases in the design of a
quasi-redundant system, under the condition imposed by
(4):

Fail-safe probability

The quasi-redundant system will
reactor trip in the following cases:

+ E

+

(N)
E
m=N-K+l/

(4)

3. Fail-Safe and Fail-Danger Analysis
(a)

(l-qdd)

Qd(J,M,K) =

The system will be in the fail-to-danger state if:

5a.
b.

Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, CC, Cu and C.
If Jmax = Mmax = 1,
Obtain Jmax and Mmax'
then set Kopt = 1, Rmax = R(1,1,1) and go to
step 25; otherwise continue.
Set Rmax =
Set k+k+1

O,

k

=

0.

Evaluate R(1, Mmax, k); if R(l, Mmax, k)
Rmax,
then go to step 5a, otherwise go to step 4.
Rmax = R(1, Mmax, k), K1 = k;
Set R(1, Mmax, K1) = Rmaxs Rmax =
Set k÷k+l

Set
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go
0,

to

k

=

step

2b.

Evaluate R(Jmax, 1, k); if R(Jmax, 1, k) < Rmax,
then go to step 8a, otherwise go to step 7.
Set Rmax = R(Jmax, 1, k), K2 = k; go to step 5b.

6.
7.

Set R(Jmax, 1, K2) = Rmax, k = 0.
If R(1, Mmax' K1) 2 Rmax, then go to step 9a;
otherwise go to step 17a.
Set Rmax = R(1, Mmax5 K1), J = 1, Kopt = K1,
M = Mmax and i = 0.
Evaluate x = C - C(J,M)
Set i4-i+l; if i>M-1, then go to step 25 otherwise continue.

8a.
b.
9a.
b.
c.

10a.

Evaluate y = (J.cu.i+x)/(cc + (M-i)cu)
If y . 1, then set J*-J+[y] and go to step
otherwise go to step 9c.
Set Rmax = 0.

b.
lla.
b.

Ila;

Set k*-k+l

Evaluate R(J, M-i, k); if R(J, M-i, k) i Rmax,
then go to step 14 otherwise go to step 13.
Set Rmax = R(J, M-i, k), K, = k and go to step
lib.
If Riax > Rmax, then go to step 15; otherwise
go to step 16a.
Set 1M4--i, i=0, Rmax = Rmax, Kopt = Kl, and go
to step 9b.
Set Jopt = J[Y] *, Mopt = M.
Evaluate C(Jopt, Mopt) and go to step 26.
Set J = Jmax, M = 1, Kopt = K2 and i=0.
Evaluate x = C - C(J,M).
Set i-<i+l; if i>J-1, then go to step 25
otherwise continue.
Evaluate y = (M1cu.i + cc.i + x)/(J-i)cu
If y 2 1, then set M4-14+[y] * and go to step 19a;
otherwise go to step 17c.
Set Raax = 0

12.

13.
14.

15.
16a.
b.

17a.
b.
c.
18a.
b.

19a.

Set k÷k+1
Evaluate R(J-i, M, k); if R(J-i, M, k) < Rmax,
then go to step 22, otherwise go to step 21.
Set Rmax = R(J-i, M, k), K2 = k and go to step
19b.
If Rmax > Rmax, then go to step 23; otherwise
go to step 24.
Set JvJ-i, i=0, Rmax = Rmax, Kopt = K2 and go to
step 17b.
Set Mopt = M-[y]*5 Jopt = J and go to step 16b.
Set Jopt = J5 Mopt = M and obtain C(Jopt, Mopt).
Print Jopt, Mopt, Kopt5 Rrnax and C(Jopt, Mopt);
terminate the programme.

b.
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

5b- 8a:
9a- 9b:

9c-10

i=7, y = 7/8 < 1

i=8, y = 8/7 > 1, [y]* = 1
Riax = R(2, 12-8, 6) = 0.9416
M = 4
Rmax = 0.9416
x=l
i=l, y = 3/6 < 1
i=2, y= 1, [y]* = 1

11 -14

9b
9c-10

Rmax = R(3, 4-2, 4) = 0.9683

11 -14

M = 2

Rmax = 0.9683

9b
9c-10 :

x=0

i=l, y

=

3/4

i=2 > M-l=l

< 1

Jopt = 3, Mopt = 2, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.9683, C(3,2) = 15.

25

5.

Specified Reliability at Minimum Cost

The problem posed in this section is to achieve a
given reliability Rg, at minimum cost; i.e., it is
required to obtain Jopt, Mopt and Kopt such that

C(Jopt, Mopt) = min, for

(7)

R(Jopt, Mopt, Kopt) > Rg

(8)

Consider the case of the simplest possible design,
i.e., J=1, M=1; if (8) is satisfied, then this is the
optimal design since (7) is satisfied. In general (8)
will not be satisfied for the case of the simplest
design, and therefore the design should be adjusted
sytematically until both (7) and (8) are satisfied.
Algorithm B is used to obtain the optimal design for
the present problem (it includes algorithm A).

Algorithm B
Steps:

0.

1.

2a.
b.
3.
4.
5.

Example 1

6.

Let qcs = 0.05, qcd = 0.02, qus = 0.1, qud = 0.07;
cc = 3, cu = 1 and C = 15 capital units. Following
algorithm A it is:

7.

Step:

K2 = 2, R(3, 1, 2) = 0.9244
Rmax = 0.9299, x _ 0
i=l, y = 1/14 < 1
i=2, y = 2/13 < 1

Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, RgV cc, cu.
Set J=1, M=1 and K=1. If R(J, M, K) 2 Rg, then go
te
to step 6; otherwise continue to step
If cc < cu, then set w = cc; otherwise set w = cu.
Set C = cu + CC
Set C+-C + w
Use algorithm A to obtain Jopt' Mopt, Kopt and

Rmax.

If Rmax 2 Rg, then go to step 7; otherwise go to
step 3.
Set Jopt = J, Mopt = M, Kopt = K.
Print Jopt, Mopts Kopt and C(Jopt, Mopt);
terminate the programme.

Example 2
Let qcs = 0.06, qcd = 0.04, qus
0.12, qud 0.08,
cc = 2, cu = 1 and Rg = 0.89; following algorithm B
it is:
=

0
2

-

1 :

-

5a:

12
Jmax 3, Mma
K, = 7, R(1, 12, 7)
=

=

=

0.9299

=
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Step:

Example 3

0 - 1 :

R(1, 1, 1) = 0.7200

2a- 2b:

w=l
C=3
C=4

3
:
4 - 5 :

Step:

Jopt

= 1, Mopt = 2, Kopt = 2

Rmax = 0.7488
:
3
C=5
4 - 5 : Jopt = 1, Mopt = 3, Kopt = 2
Rmax = 0.8479
: C=6
3
4 - 5 : Jopt = 1, Mopt = 4, Kopt = 3
Rmax = 0.8634
: C=7
3
4 - 5
Jopt = 1, Mopt = 5, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.8830
: C=8
3
4 - 5
Jopt = 1, Mopt = 6, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.8901
7
Jopt = 1, Mopt = 6, Kopt = 4
C(1,6) = 8.
Algorithm B can be easily improved by adding an
acceleration parameter in step 3; this will cause C
to increase quickly until Rmax > Rg; when Rmax > Rg,
the value of C is reset to that of the previous step,
and the acceleration parameter is reset to 1. The
process terminates when the reliability level is
achieved for a cost C(Jopt, Mopt) and it is not
achieved for C(Jopt - Mopt) - w.
6.

Let Rg = 0.945, Qg = 0.003 and assume the parameters
used in Example 2. Following the steps of algorithm C
it is:

0 -5b :

Jopt=3, Mopt=3,
Kopt=5

Rmax=09579
Sc-5e :

3 -5b :

k=l
k=2
k=3
k=4

0. 2629
0.5868
0.7783
0.9018

=0.
0.0001
0.0006
0.0033

0. 1791
0.4723
0.6941
0. 8962
0.9526

'0.
=0.
0.0001
0.0006
0.0024
0.0053

0. 2814
0.6018
0. 8377
0.9460

=0.
0.0004
0.0029

Jopt=3 Mopt=4,
Kopt=7

Rmax=0.9691
5c-5e :

3 -5b :

k=l
k=2
k=3
k=4
k=5
k=6

0.8099

Jopt=4 Mopt=29
Kopt=S

Rmax=0.9711
5c-5e:

k-i
k=2
k=3
k=4

7

Jopt=4 Mopt=2,

:

=0.

Kopt=4
R(4,2,4) = 0.9460> Rg

Combined Safety Requirements

Consider the design of a quasi-redundant
protective system satisfying two requirements; for
example, let one requirement be to achieve a
reliability above a specified level Rg, and the other
to achieve a fail-to-danger probability below a
specified level Qg. Both the above requirements should
be achieved at the minimum possible cost. The
previous algorithms can be used to solve the present
problem. Algorithm B (includes algorithm A) can be
easily modified as follows:

R(Jopt,lMoptgk) Qd(Jopt,Moptqk)

Qd(4,2,4) = 0.0029< Qg

7.

Conclusions

The use of the developed algorithms allows the
design of quasi-redundant systems to satisfy the
desired safety characteristics. The algorithms
presented have been implemented in FORTRAN IV and a
number of design problems have been solved. By
letting either qcs = qcd = 0, the results are applicable
to conventional K-out-of-N:G systems.

Algorithm C
Steps:
0.
1-4
5a.
b.
c.
d.

:

:

:
:
:
:

e.

:

6-7

:

As step 0 of algorithm B; read Rg, Qg.
As steps 1-4 of algorithm B.
If Rmax > Rg, then go to step 5b; otherwise
go to step 3.
Set k=O,R = 0 and Q' = 1.
Set k*-k+l
Evaluate A = R(Jopt, Mopt, k) and
B = Qd(Jopt, Mopt, k); if A 2 Rg and B< Qg,

then go to step 7; otherwise go to step 5e.
If A < R(Jopt, Mopt, k-i) or B < Qd(Jopt'
Mopt, k-i), then go to step 3; otherwise go
to step 5c.
As steps 6-7 of algorithm B.
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